INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant difficulties facing UN Agencies and NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) when responding to a rapid onset humanitarian disaster is to understand the requirements of the affected population accurately and swiftly (Heigh et al, 2007) . This is not a trivial task, for example in the case of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake an area approximately the size of Belgium was devastated. Many of the major roads were blocked, and even if this had not been so, a large percentage of the population lives in scattered and isolated high altitude communities that could only be reached on foot, by pack animal or by helicopter.
Key to the immediate response is the so-called Needs Assessment (NA) process which is aimed at understanding the beneficiaries' requirements so that these can be integrated into the overall supply network picture which will also include factors such as the availability of transport and warehousing. In the humanitarian context, there is a clear premium to be gained from achieving accuracy and speed in completing the NA as this will lead to a direct saving of life and/or a reduction in the adverse conditions to be endured by those affected by the disaster. Conversely, failure to achieve an accurate and timely assessment may result in unnecessary loss of life.
Unfortunately, current direct assessment methods are time consuming, and the data capture is often not conducted in a systematic way with the locations sampled not being geographically representative (too clustered and too few), and the subsequent reports being produced too late. Thus, in order to improve the speed of data capture, NGOs often resort to proxy indicators such as observations from satellites, aircraft or helicopters. Whilst these can be effective, the use of helicopters for such tasks means that they are not available for cargo carrying and/or ambulance duties which are generally deemed to have a higher priority. As least in part, the difficulty of assessing the needs of a community leads to the situation reported by Risepak (2006) in which, in the aftermath of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, a more remote village was 25% less likely to be assisted than a less remote one.
Against this background, it will be appreciated that the need for timely and accurate reconnaissance and surveillance information is shared with all military forces. As a result, many countries (and not just in the Western world) are using Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS) to support their armies in the conduct of missions that are, typically, characterised as Dangerous, Dirty or Dull (SECDEF, 2005) . A more detailed discussion of the capabilities of an appropriate UAVS will be given later in the paper, but it will be appreciated that the attributes of a particular system -its speed, endurance, sensors, maximum altitude etc -vary enormously. Indeed, a recent survey by Hughes (2007) indicated that there are over 600 UAVS in existence manufactured by 250 companies in 42 countries that range in size from an executive jet to a hand launched device. Nevertheless, in the context of this research, it will be assumed that the UAVS will (as a minimum requirement) provide the controller with real (or near real) time pictures of the location being surveyed.
AIM
Given the extensive use of UAVS in a wide range of military and civil applications, it is surprising to note that, to date, they have been only limited instances of their employment to support the post-disaster Needs Assessment process. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to assess the contribution that such a system might make to this process and to outline the conditions for successful operation. The paper will use a Case Study of the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake to illustrate how a UAVS might be employed, and its potential effectiveness and associated cost will be compared with alternative means of carrying out the NA task.
The paper is structured as follows: it will begin with a discussion of the relevant supply network management (SNM) literature that will set the NA concept in an appropriate framework. Then, in order to bound the scope of the work, a brief discussion of disaster relief taxonomies will be presented, followed by a more detailed review of the aims of the overall NA process. The next section will outline the initial stages of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake, before discussing the how, conceptually, the use of a UAVS might have contributed to mitigating the effects of such a disaster. The penultimate section discusses the resultant technical requirement for a UAVS together with consideration of the potential barriers to its operation. The paper ends with a discussion of the broad conditions for success and a number of recommendations for further research are advanced.
The 2005 Pakistan Earthquake was chosen as the Case Study as it represents a large scale rapid onset disaster which took place over a significant geographic area. Thus, the inherent speed and mobility of a UAVS were perceived to be potentially of particular benefit in supporting the NA process and reducing the overall risk of the humanitarian response. The paper will, however, also consider a lesser magnitude disaster (the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake in Indonesia) as a means of helping to validate the author's conclusions.
The paper is conceptual in its approach, but is based on earlier work to understand the detailed activities by the many national and international agencies following the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake . To this has been added a review of literature position the NA process within existing SNM models, together with that relating to the general design and use of UAVS, their associated data gathering potential, and issues relating to their comparative financial viability and practical effectiveness.
POSITIONING THE STUDY WITHIN THE SUPPLY NETWORK MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
Within the SNM literature, there is broad agreement that timeliness of delivery is a key order-winning criterion (eg Christopher, 2005) . As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, achieving such timeliness is vital in the response to a disaster when lives rather than profits are at risk. Thus, whilst NGOs have developed a series of preplanned responses to potential disasters, such a "push" approach is inherently less efficient than one based on accurate identification of the real demand. Thus, for example, the initial reaction to the 2004 Asian Tsunami saw many thousands of blankets and tents being flown into what was, essentially, a tropical location. As a result, the supply network became blocked with such unwanted items whilst life-saving commodities were held up at airheads etc.
Clearly some form of pre-planned response is essential, but equally essential is the requirement to identify the true demand in order that the forecasting models can be amended in the light of the prevailing circumstances (Harrison & van Hoek, 2005) . In the context of fast moving consumer goods, this information is captured (eg through electronic point of sale devices) and is then shared throughout the network. Unfortunately, such a technologically driven approach is impossible in the aftermath of a disaster, not least because of the effect of that disaster on both the physical and information infrastructure. In addition, and unlike the commercial supply network in which the customers are normally able to articulate their demands with relative ease, those affected by a disaster may not be in a position to do so. For example, they may be focussed on simply staying alive or assisting other members of the community. Thus, external agencies such as NGOs are frequently required to act as proxy customers who must trigger the supply network on behalf of the beneficiaries.
Given also that the staff of the NGOs are likely to be from a different country and, thus, less familiar with issues such as the local dietary and cultural norms, there is an increased risk of a misalignment between the real demand and that perceived by the external agency. In addition, it will be noted that the logistic response to a rapid onset disaster is, in effect, a temporary supply network that has be developed extremely quickly, with multiple national and international players (many, if not most, of whom will not have previously met or worked alongside each other). Thus, unlike established supply networks supporting fixed installations such as supermarkets with optimised physical and communications infrastructures, the humanitarian supply network exhibits significantly greater complexity and, hence, risk. To the extent that the beneficiaries needs can be understood quickly and accurately, one such source of risk will be reduced.
As will be discussed in more detail later in this paper, a number of methods exist for capturing the demands of the affected population (in other words the Needs Assessment process), and each has a range of benefits relating to the accuracy and speed of the information captured -with the inevitable trade-off between these two variables. In line with the general perspective of Contingency Theory, no one model or approach is likely to be always effective in the complex and uncertain environment of post-disaster relief. Given that, to date, there has been limited use of UAVS as but one of the potential means of achieving an accurate and timely Needs Assessment, this paper seeks to expose the benefits and limitations of this technology -and, hence, its potential as part of the NA process.
DISASTER RELIEF MODELS
Whilst the occurrence of disasters is clearly not new per se, there is an increasing awareness of their consequences on individuals and populations, a country's physical infrastructure and the environment. This is has led to development of a number of models that categorize disasters in relation to their origins (eg natural v man made), the speed of their development (rapid onset v complex emergencies) and the phases of the disaster relief programme (see Long (1997) , Ludema & Roos (2000) , Houghton (2006 ), van Wassenhove (2006 , and ). However, the model offered by Safran (2003) (Figure 1 ) has particular resonance because of its emphasis on the cyclical nature of disaster relief. Thus, the recovery phase of one disaster links to a new prevention phase to mitigate the effects of potential future disasters. However, the main focus of this paper is on the NA process as it relates to Safran's "transition" phase,
THE NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROCESS
In a broad ranging discussion of the whole spectrum of Needs Assessment published by the Center for International Emergency, Disaster and Refugee Studies (CIEDRS, 2003) , the authors also emphasise the linkage between the NA process and the disaster relief cycle. They also adopt a contingent approach noting that in each phase of the cycle, different evaluation techniques are appropriate. For example, censuses conducted in the prevention phase will form the baseline for any subsequent data gathering following the disaster itself. In the transition phase, however, the generic aim of NA is to determine the approximate size of the affected population and their needs -to answer the questions "What has happened?" and "What is needed?" (CIEDRS, 2003, p10) . Thus, according to the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the initial NA is designed to:
"Provide a quick overview of how a population has been affected by a crisis, including who is likely to be at greatest risk of mortality and acute morbidity and why; and to identify priorities … for an initial comprehensive humanitarian response…" (IASC, 2007, p4) , The IASC stresses that such an evaluation must be achieved quickly -starting within 72 hours of the disaster onset and, ideally, being completed within one week. It should also offer a view of both the current needs of the relevant section of the population as well as those anticipated over the next 6-12 weeks (ie, in effect, up to the start of Safran's recovery phase).
Both the CIEDRS and IASC reports also underline the need to adopt a "triangulation" approach in which data from a variety of sources is integrated to help ensure the accuracy of the overall picture. Triangulation is also important because, under the current model for funding disaster relief which tends to provide increased funding in line with the increased magnitude of a disaster, there is a clear need to ensure objectivity in the NA process (Darcy & Hofmann, 2003) . Thus, although historically NA was achieved by means of a Drive or Walk Through either conducted directly by NGO personnel or via a third party relaying the results to NGOs, aerial surveillance in one form or another is increasingly being used to support and triangulate these first-hand findings. The following table summarises the positive and negative aspects of these approaches. • Cloud cover reduces the image quality, although the use of millimetric radar helps overcome this issue.
• The interpretation of satellite images is metaphorically) of the disaster.
• Large areas can be surveyed in a small time window.
time consuming and requires skilled personnel especially as they are, essentially, 2-Dimensional.
• The repeat frequency (ie the time between a satellite re-passing a location) can be low (1-20 days), thus it does not necessarily provide real-time or near real-time capability.
• Potential government restrictions on areas that may be photographed.
• Provides only a sub-set of NA information requirement.
• High resolution images are expensive to purchase from commercial sources.
Imagery from a Manned Aircraft or Helicopter
• Compared with a satellite, there is greater "local control" over a manned aircraft.
• The repeat frequency and area is at the NGO's discretion.
• High resolution and, to an extent, 3-D photography are possible.
• Provides near real time (or in some cases real time) capability • Can combine reconnaissance role with other tasking (eg casualty evacuation)
• Cloud cover not only has the potential to reduce the availability of usable images, but (together with other factors such as high winds) may also inhibit the operation of the aircraft itself.
• The aircraft may not be able to operate at the desired altitude.
• Potential government restrictions on areas that may be photographed • Provides only a sub-set of NA information requirement
Imagery from a UAVS • Although they may be affected by meteorological phenomena, UAVS can operate at low level in cloud and medium precipitation conditions that would not be allowed for manned aircraft (Horcher & Visser, 2004 ).
• The cost/hour is similar to a manned aircraft, and less than a helicopter.
• Can be brought into operation more quickly than a manned aircraft and requires less maintenance infrastructure (McGarry, 2005) .
• Requires less launching/landing area than a manned fixed wing aircraft.
• Loss of a UAV is unlikely to lead directly to loss of life.
• Provides real time imagery.
• Endurance significantly greater than manned aircraft/helicopter.
• Is under direct control of operator.
• Reduced number of take off/landings herself, and to interact with affected population.
• Easy to implement.
• Extremely time consuming and requires an ability to access the affected areas -especially those away from tracks.
• Potential for bias and misinterpretation by assuming that the conditions actually seen are more broadly applicable.
Having outlined the generic ways in which data can be collected to support the Needs Assessment process, the next section of this paper will introduce the background to the Case Study -the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake.
THE 2005 PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE
An earthquake of magnitude 7.6 on the Richter scale occurred on 8 th October 2005 at 0850 local time in an area centred 95km Northeast of Pakistan's capital (Islamabad). The quake caused damage over an area of some 30,000 sq km (ie approximately a circle with a radius of 100km from the epicentre), and the main event was followed by 978 aftershocks of magnitude 4.0 or above over the following three weeks. The Pakistan earthquake was one of the most serious of the world's recent natural disasters (for comparison, see Table 2 ). The affected area is characterised by a harsh mountainous terrain with many villages (containing some 40% of the population) located at considerable altitude (Op Update 6, IFRC, 2005) . These are accessible via a network of tracks that are frequently only passable on foot or with pack animals, thus the remoteness of the area, the destruction of such roads and bridges that existed, the difficulty of the terrain and the harsh winter conditions shortly after the earthquake all conspired to make the evaluation of the immediate needs of the population an extremely difficult undertaking.
In practice, a large number (>100) of NGOs supported the National and International response to this disaster. Unfortunately, there is no common standard or format for conducting a NA -notwithstanding attempts at various levels and through various coordinating bodies (Grant, 2007) . That said, there is only a relatively limited set of relevant information and, for the purposes of this paper, the Rapid Village Assessment (RVA) format used by the (UN) Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) has been taken as the baseline. This contains the following relevant section headings against which the use of a UAVS for gathering the requisite data will be analysed: The details of the capabilities of a UAVS will be considered in the next section, but, as noted earlier, it will be assumed that these will include a real time (or near real time) video camera and an IR sensor. These two devices would enable capture of data relating to Items 2, 4 & 6 of the RVA form -ie a crude estimate of the population in a particular location (or, for example, whether an area has been evacuated); the ease of access to that location, and the material state of the infrastructure (houses etc). The use of the IR facility may provide further information such as the evidence of cooking fires which would help indicate the status of the village. The actual capability to capture this data will, at least in part, depend on the capabilities of the chosen UAVS and the options in this respect will now be discussed.
THE CAPABILITIES OF A UAVS
Although UAVS have existed for over 30 years, their current capabilities at the time of writing this paper (2007) will undoubtedly be exceeded in the future -for example, it is predicted that they may become so inexpensive (in terms of their capital cost) as to be disposable (USAF, 2005) . Existing systems use of graphite composite airframe materials, highly efficient propulsion systems and smaller payloads which include Charged Couple Device (CCD) technology to drive miniature video cameras, compact inertial guidance, GPS and communications links with a real time download capability. They are able to achieve levels of endurance that exceed human tolerance and this brings a "persistent surveillance" capability, and with a commensurately reduced requirement for take-off and landing, there is a lower risk of accident or mishap (USAF, 2005).
As mentioned above there are a large number of UAVS in existence and, as a result, a broad classification scheme has been introduced (see: Munro & Krus, 2002, p1) . The focus of this research is on those described as "MALE" (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) -ie with an endurance of up to 25 hours, and an operational ceiling of 40,000 feet. Whilst the majority of such UAVS are military, other uses are identified in the literature including border patrols in the USA and Canada (Hughes, 2007a) , the Australian littoral (Finn et al, 2002) , Iraq (Katzman, 2005) and the UK (Finn & Taher, 2007) ; maritime search and rescue (SAR) (Robinson, 2006) ; fish location (Hughes, 2007) , weather forecasting (USN, 2007) ; hurricane observation (McGarry, 2005) ; forestry mapping and observation (Horcher & Visser, 2004) and similar applications which combine the requirement for high quality imagery that can be gathered either under direct control of a remote operator or via a pre-programmed mission profile. Apart from budgetary considerations, the exact choice of platform will reflect a matchmaking process between the data requirements, the time until such data has low or no value, and the capabilities of the UAVS (Preece et al, 2007) .
Given that UAVS such as the United States Air Force "Predator" are reported to have the ability to identify a heat source as small as a person from 10,000 ft (Robinson, 2006) one might have anticipated that UAVS are already routinely being used in response to disasters. However, McGarry (writing in 2005) suggests that the only recorded use of a UAVS in such a context took place in Hurricane Katrina which devastated New Orleans in August of that year. In reality, however, much of this activity could not strictly be described as involving the use of a UAVS. In one case a UAV was located on a high building in the area and manually rotated. Clearly such a fixed location severely compromised the UAV's potential data capture capability as, for example, it would have only been able to observe events and activities in a direct line of sight from its location and not areas in the "shadow" of buildings. In the second case, a UAV was physically attached to a manned aircraft and flown over the affected area. Again, this made good use of the system's sensors, but was not an "unmanned" event.
Nevertheless, it would appear that this absence of UAVS was not due to a lack of belief in their potential benefit to the rescue agencies, rather that, in the chaotic aftermath of this disaster, the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) banned their use on safety grounds. The FAA understandably was concerned lest the presence of UAVS might lead to mid-air collisions with the 150/hour helicopter movements and unquantified number of light aircraft that were transiting the area at the same time (McGarry, 2005; Robinson, 2006) . More positively, McGarry reports that, away from the centre of the disaster, two UAVs were employed for activities such as checking roof tops for stranded people. McGarry notes that, in addition to its imaging capability, a particular benefit was the ability to put the UAVS into service in some 10 minutes after arriving at the launch site -ie significantly more quickly than, for example, a manned helicopter.
Since 2005 there has been some limited reporting of the successful use of a "ScanEagle" UAVS for ground surveillance following the April 2007 Solomon Islands tsunami (USN, 2007) . It would appear that the UAV was launched and recovered from USNS STOCKHAM and undertook missions to assess the damage in and around a Nation of 900 islands and 3000 miles of coast line. In doing so, the UAV enabled the STOCKHAM's helicopters to be deployed on casualty evacuation and the provision of relief goods. Once again, although the reports do not specify the effectiveness of the system as a whole, one can surmise that it made use of its broad range of capabilities including a stabilized camera turret that allows the both the electro optical and infrared cameras to track a moving object (such as a person) or a vehicle (which is understood to be possible from a distance of some 5 miles) (INSITU, 2007) . With an endurance of 18 hours achieved on a fuel consumption of 2 gallons, it would appear to offer a highly effective surveillance and reconnaissance capability (Katzman, 2005) .
THE COST OF A UAVS
In terms of the performance of a UAV, the choice (and, hence, cost) reflects a compromise between three factors -the weight of the vehicle itself, the payload and the endurance (which can, in effect, be considered a function of the weight of the fuel carried). The following table offers a broad order estimate of the capital cost of a UAVS: To this must be added the ground systems and the support infrastructure costs which, it is suggested by Galaxy RPV (2007) , increase the overall capital cost ten-fold. However Horcher & Visser (2004) describe the use of a short range UAV for forestry mapping with an initial cost of $42,000 which included the platform, base station, guidance software and training. Within this, the platform itself cost some $20,000 (ie approx 50%). In addition, the operating costs must be included and these are estimated at $400-500/flying hour (Morgan, 2000) which is similar to that of a light aircraft, but rather less than a helicopter at $600-800/flying hour www.uavforum.com (2007) .
Clearly aggregating the above data demonstrates the huge variability that exists, but there is general consensus that the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a UAV is significantly less than a manned aircraft (USAF, 2005) . For example, the former does not need to use space for life preserving equipment such as ejection seats and oxygen, whilst the cost of training the pilot of a manned USAF aircraft was estimated in 2005 to be $685,000 compared with a UAV operator at $13,000 (UAV Market Space, 2007). Indeed, Chuen (2001) suggests that the LCC for a UAV may be as little as 10% of the costs of manned aircraft -however it is also broadly recognised that both the metrics and data for UAVs are highly immature and, therefore, are unreliable for comparative use (UAV Market Space, 2007) .
FROM GENERALITIES TO SPECIFICS
Given the huge range of UAVS that are potentially "in scope", one has been selected in order to demonstrate the concept and its applicability as part of the response to the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake. This platform is marketed by Aerosonde Pty (in Australia) but it is emphasised that this does not imply any endorsement of this particular system, rather that its performance and support capabilities reflect those of MALE UAVS in general. The system specifications are available at www.aerosonde.com, but the following key aspects should be noted:
• It has a "crew" of three (pilot, controller and maintainer).
• It can be launched (by catapult) from the roof of a 4*4, but needs a 300m landing area for recovery.
• With a payload of 5kg (which would accommodate the necessary visual and IR cameras), its endurance is some 10 hours.
• It can operate at an altitude of up to 20,000ft (6km) with a full payload.
• Weight (of UAV) 30lb (14kg); Wingspan 10ft (3m).
• Its capital cost is approx $35,000.
The following is a picture of such a UAV is at Figure 2 (noting that a similar example has recently completed an unmanned, non stop, transatlantic crossing in just under 26 hours using 1.5 gallons of fuel).
EXAMPLE MISSION PROFILE
In order to offer an example of a mission profile, an area of the affected area of Pakistan was chosen based on the availability of data relating to the geographic location and population of a representative group of villages. The mission was constructed around the area of Basantkot which is located some 2.5km from a main road and 11.5km from the earthquake epicentre. As can be seen from the photograph at Figure  3 , the village is, in fact, a collection of small settlements -and this is typical for the area.
Setting this village into broader context, it is one of a group of villages set in a branch of the Lower Neelum Valley which is, itself, paralleled by a metalled road which could be used to launch and recover the UAV platform. As will be seen from the figure below, there are some 19 villages in the valley and the "circular" route between them would cover some 20km (and an overall altitude gain and loss of some 5,000 feet). Thus, assuming the maximum payload of 5kg, a flying speed of 100km/hour and an endurance of 10 hours without refuelling, each village could be visited in turn with a loiter time of some 30 minutes/village.
The following table is designed compare the use of a UAV with a fixed wing light aircraft and a helicopter. As discussed above, the availability of comparable costs is limited, but the table nevertheless is believed to offer a broad order indication. The "mission" is also as described above -ie 20km of flight + 30 mins loitering in the area of each of the 19 villages From the above it will be seen that a MALE UAV (such as the Aerosonde exemplar) is not only significantly cheaper to buy, it would not require re-fuelling to complete the mission (and thus avoids loss of time in transit). UAVS can also operate is less favourable weather conditions and be brought into operation more quickly than their manned counterparts. Importantly, a mission duration of 10 hours would, in order to avoid fatigue, require at least two pilots for the helicopter and light aircraft, whilst the fixed wing aircraft would require a defined take off and landing area of greater length than that needed for the UAV.
It is, of course, relevant to compare the various means of aerial reconnaissance with the traditional vehicle or pedestrian assessment. Whilst no specific data for the Basantkot area has been located, it is relevant to note that the general devastation in the area was such that one area of 14 villages with a population of around 15,000 was first visited some 9 days after the earthquake struck (IFRC, 2005) . Similarly, Özerdem (2006) reports that Pakistan's Relief Commissioner had state that there were 41 villages that had not been accessed by relief and rescue teams one month after the earthquake. Situations such as this led to the use of "Quake Jumpers" which were small teams who were landed by helicopter on the ridge line above a valley and who then descended visiting and assessing the villages en route (Benini et al, 2006) . This process, although effective, was extremely slow, not least as the individual assessment teams took as much as a week to reach the valley floor (albeit they were able to make interim reports by radio at an earlier stage).
In essence, the issue becomes one of whether the use of aerial surveys (be they fixed wing, helicopter or UAVS derived) provide sufficient information for those responding to the disaster (and, in particular, the humanitarian logisticians) to confirm or modify their plans. Clearly, the larger and, potentially, more accurate data set derived from visual sightings of the affected areas is preferable, but given the time taken to gather the information it is suggested that the use of aerial surveys does provide real and practical benefit. Certainly, to the extent that these techniques are currently being used, then a UAVS would appear to provide a cost-effective means of gathering this lesser data set.
BARRIERS TO THE USE OF A UAVS IN RESPOSE TO A DISASTER
It is clear from the practitioner literature surrounding the use of UAVS that their integration within commercial air traffic control systems is problematic. Not least, this is because the current approach to air traffic control (ATC) is based on the principle of "see and avoid". In other words, it is incumbent on the pilot of any aircraft, helicopter, etc to maintain a visual lookout and to react appropriately in the event of a potential collision situation developing. Self-evidently, because of their small size and the limitations on the controller's "sight", the integration of a UAVS into mainstream ATC is causing difficulty. That said, it is reported that the US Federal Aviation Administration has issued a Certificate of Authorisation for certain classes of US military UAVs to be allowed to fly in civilian controlled airspace within the United States (Kemp, 2007) . Overall, there is a general belief that such problems are resolvable; indeed, it is predicted that by 2025 UAV Operations will be seamlessly included within mainstream National and International ATC (USAF, 2005) .
In the interim, it is suggested that the integration problem can be overcome by copying the technique currently used in military operations. In essence this utilises a "no fly zone" in which manned flight is prohibited and, as a result, a UAVS can be used without constraint. Thus, provided there is a well organised and coherent ATC systemwhich was the case in the aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake -the use of UAVS should not pose insuperable obstacles to the overall relief effort. However, if the use of a UAVS is seriously contemplated, then there would be clear benefit in carrying out prior discussion with the civil aviation and air traffic control authorities of countries in which such a system might be deployed. In an ideal world, this would lead to the development of a "standing agreement" that could be implemented as necessary.
It is also recognised that there may be political sensitivities in the use of a UAVS in certain locations -for example, the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake took place close to the disputed area of Kashmir. Thus, although helicopter flights in this area do not appear to have caused problems, it is fully accepted that the Pakistan government might have had reservations over the operation of a UAVS. However, these might not be impossible to overcome through, for example, the attachment of a governmental liaison officer to the UAVS control team with the responsibility of monitoring the flight path and ensuring that no sensitive areas were overflown. By the same token, it is accepted that members of isolated mountain communities might misconstrue the presence of a UAV as a threat rather than a potential benefit, and they might hide rather than advertise their presence. This potentially fatal flaw to the whole concept could best be overcome by use of the existing governmental information dissemination mechanisms.
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS
The key attributes of a UAVS are its flexibility, relative cheapness and ability to operate for lengthy periods in meteorological conditions that would preclude the use of manned aircraft. Thus, in circumstances where aerial surveillance is perceived to provide benefit as part of the NA process, UAVS offer advantages over and above those available from manned aircraft. However, whether and to what extent aerial surveillance does, indeed, provide value will depend on the nature of the disaster and the associated geography and make-up of the affected area. Thus, for example, the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake took place in a mountainous region in which there was only limited vehicular access -and this was, in any event, seriously disrupted by destruction of roads and bridges both in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake itself as well as through the effects of the many aftershocks that often led to the re-blocking of previously cleared routes. As a result, the use of vehicular or pedestrian surveys was extremely time consuming and in many cases failed to meet the IASC aim of completing the NA within one week. By the same token, the use of a UAVS in the Solomon Islands tsunami provided macro-level data which would have assisted in the subsequent prioritisation of the provision of relief supplies.
On the other hand, UAVS (and, indeed, other means of aerial surveying) would have been of less value in responding to the Yogyarkata earthquake as the affected area represents one of the most densely populated in the world (BAPPENAS, 2006) . As a result, aerial surveillance is less effective in allowing assessment of the state of buildings, apartment blocks etc these are relatively tightly concentrated and thus distinguishing particular areas of destruction is less easily achieved. Furthermore, the majority of the earthquake damage was to private housing and public buildings whilst the effects on the road and communications infrastructure was limited (Manfield, 2007) . Thus, pedestrian or vehicle based surveys were generally able to achieve the necessary data capture in a timely manner. Furthermore, In general, the more compact the disaster area (eg New Orleans), the greater the likelihood that there will be a concentration of air traffic movements and, therefore a greater reluctance to countenance the use of UAVS.
In terms of the choice of light aircraft, helicopters and UAVS, each has benefits and costs as discussed in Tables 1 & 4 . However, UAVS are once again more likely to be successful in mountainous areas where there are limited take off/landing facilities for fixed wing aircraft, a greater likelihood of inclement weather conditions that will preclude manned flight, and a low level of vehicular access which will lead to helicopters being used for the primary role of casualty evacuation and delivery of relief goods.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTHER RESEARCH
Based on the overall requirement for an improved Needs Assessment process that will, in turn, improve the ability of those responding to a rapid onset disaster to target their support more accurately, the use of a UAVS would appear to be technically feasible. Such a system presents a relatively cheap means of providing a basic level of assessment information, although it is fully accepted that unless and until it has been used in practice, its efficacy cannot be accurately gauged. It is suggested, therefore, that the next stage would be to conduct a trial of the use of a UAVS under a representative scenario. This would enable a greater understanding of the practical capabilities and limitations of such as system -for example whether the proposed "loiter" time of 30 minutes/village is realistic -and, hence, the extent to which it could usefully supplement the existing Needs Assessment processes. Of particular value to the humanitarian logistician would be the potential capability of a UAV to reconnoitre a road or track in order to understand its capacity (eg what size of truck could safely use the route) and what obstacles (eg small land slides, washed out culverts etc) exist. This is not currently possible using satellite imagery and, although achievable by helicopter, this incurs a significant cost. Ideally, such a trial would take place in a disaster prone area as, to do so, would help smooth the way with governmental and non-governmental agencies were it decided to deploy such a system in the event of a real emergency.
It is emphasised that this paper has been written from a theoretical and conceptual standpoint, albeit advice has been taken from the staff of the UNJLC who are directly involved in the support of humanitarian logistic responses. It is nevertheless appreciated that the practicalities of the operation of a UAVS outweigh its data capture benefits. However, given that the cost of building and operating a UAVS is, like many such developing technologies, reducing whilst its operational capabilities are increasing, it would seem likely (if not inevitable) that a UAVS would perform a useful and costeffective function within the overall post-disaster Needs Assessment process and, thereby, assist in the mitigation of the risk in the response to such a disaster. 
